Announcements:
Indiana Linux Fest
When: April 29th, 30th, and May 1st, 2011
Where: Holiday Inn – Glenwood Avenue in Raleigh, NC
http://www.carolinacon.org/
When: Thursday, May 5, 2011 – Thursday, July 7, 2011
Where: Federal Way, WA
http://www.sans.org/mentor/details.php?nid=24569
My Hard Drive Died
Data Recovery Expert Certification
When: June 6-10, 2011
Where: Atlanta, GA
http://www.myharddrivedied.com/data-recovery-training
When: Sept 19-22, 2011
Where: Brussels, Belgium
http://blog.brucon.org/2011/02/confirmation-of-brucon-dates.html
CFP & CFT open now! http://blog.brucon.org/2011/01/brucon-call-for-papers-2011.html
When: September 30th – October 2, 2011
Where: Louisville, KY
http://www.derbycon.com/
ISDpodcast Mailing List: http://groups.google.com/group/isdpodcast
Information Security Leaders Survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/isl-2011-certsurvey
Hackers for Charity Cookbook is asking the hacker community to contribute their best recipes to be included in a Hackers Cookbook. ALL PROCEEDS GO TO HACKERS FOR CHARITY!!! 100%. Submit your best recipes to cookfu@304geeks.com for consideration. First round of submissions are due by 4/1/2011
Intro/Outro Music provided by JimmyZ (http://soundcloud.com/jimmyz)
Stories
Source: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/mutillidae-deliberately-vulnerable-php-owasp-top-10
Mutillidae: A Deliberately Vulnerable Set Of PHP Scripts That Implement The OWASP Top 10. Version 2.0 beta has just been released.
http://www.irongeek.com/downloads/mutillidae2.0.1beta.zip
Source: http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/jericho-forum/2011/03/after-the-breach—how-secure-is-rsas-securid/
Source: http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/security/3265825/rsa-warns-securid-customers-about-hack/
Source: http://www.csoonline.com/article/678070/rsa-breach-puts-apt-back-in-the-spotlight
Source: http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20044775-245.html
Source: http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20044455-245.html
Source: http://www.readwriteweb.com/enterprise/2011/03/rsa-breach-an-attack-that-used.php
Source: http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=10765
I was asked by Kevin, a guy that used to work with me a long time ago to comment on the whole RSA breach. To be honest, we talked about it last Friday so I was a little reluctant at first, that was until yesterday. Reactions to the RSA breach have been as varied as the security community itself. They've ranged from the "it's not a big deal" to "OMG!". We wanted to take a few moments and discuss the breach, what we know about it, what it means and what does (wait for it) APT really mean to us.
So what do we know? Well, on March 17th RSA, the security division of EMC, suffered a breach and data loss following an "extremely sophisticated cyber attack." Their investigation revealed that the information extracted from the company systems was related to its SecurID two-factor authentication products.
What does it mean? RSA SecurID is a hardware token that are identical internally except for the unique printed serial number on the outside of each one. Each token is initialized with a secret ‘seed’ value, and a cryptographically protected copy of that seed value is sent to the token purchaser to install into their authentication server. The algorithm, which is based on AES, uses that seed value combined with the internal clock to generate the numbers displayed. Normally customers buy a large batch of tokens at one time, and receive a file containing that batch of seed values.
If RSA's attackers were somehow able to obtain the seed records then things are much worse then it would seem at first blush. Again, the reason is because these seed records are used to generate the unique, one-time passwords that SecureID generates every 30 seconds or so in order to authenticate the user. If the attackers have access to the seed they could potentially can calculate the number that is shown on the token during authentication.
- Is APT something that everyone should be worrying about and planning for (is APT pervasive or just hype)?
- Explain how APT works (reconnaissance, phishing, infection, exfiltration)?
- What industries are targeted the most with APT?
- What data is most often taken (this goes to adding more protections around the most valuable data)?
- What are the most common Trojans used with APT?
- How can you tell you've been infected by APT?
- What can be used for detection (system logs, AV logs, IDS logs, Netflows, DNS, VPN logs, Full packet capture, File system analysis)?
- What can be done (logs, correlation of data across the enterprise, combine response efforts into a central location, keep data longer)?
- How long should you maintain this network data (3 months, 6 months, 9 months, a year)?
- What can be used for Mitigation (DNS/IP Sink Hole, system remediation and reimage)?
- What can your security vendor company do to mitigate the risks of APT (asked to the panelists)?
- Do you notify law enforcement when you find APT (or the company that you saw was infected by this malware)?
- Do you recommend security awareness to all employees and if so, do you have any examples/suggestions?
- Are you seeing APT being used by certain countries or is it equally used across the globe?
- What is missing from a technology, training, resources, policy perspective that needs to be addressed?
- Do we have all the tools to combat APT?
- Should vendors cryptographically sign all the code, including JavaScript, that they produce so that users can verify that they are really running the code they think they’re running?
I personally think there is a good bit of hype with APT as with anything. STUXNet was so overhyped that you have probably gotten to the point where people cringe when they hear that name. However, the reality is that APT is real and it is pervasive, but it is nothing new. That being said, it does highlight the need for every company to gain insight into why someone would target them and what are the "crown jewels" to a business, thus what they need to protect. The Penetration Execution Standard (http://www.pentest-standard.org) does a great job of highlighting OSINT (OpenSource Intelligence) that should be gather as part of a penetration test. But unfortunately, we as pentesters aren't doing it and companies aren't either. Therefore, it stands to reason that most companies wouldn't know who is/would be targeting then and what they would be after.
Source: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/03/scada-vulnerabilities/
A breach involving an affiliate Comodo RA (registration authority). The RA is an entity trusted to register other entities or to authenticate those who are being issued a certificate. Comodo is reporting that root keys, intermediate CAs (certificate authorities) and secure hardware were not affected in this breach. The fraudulent certificates were issued by the UTN-USERFirst-Hardware certificate authority.
These certificates may be used to spoof content, perform phishing attacks, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks against all web browser users, including users of Internet Explorer. Credentials for a Comodo Account in Southern Europe were compromised and used to issue nine fraudulent certificates for seven Internet domains:
|
Affected Domain |
Serial |
|
mail.google.com |
047ECBE9FCA55F7BD09EAE36E10CAE1E |
|
www.google.com |
00F5C86AF36162F13A64F54F6DC9587C06 |
|
login.yahoo.com |
00D7558FDAF5F1105BB213282B707729A3 |
|
login.yahoo.com |
392A434F0E07DF1F8AA305DE34E0C229 |
|
login.yahoo.com |
3E75CED46B693021218830AE86A82A71 |
|
login.skype.com |
00E9028B9578E415DC1A710A2B88154447 |
|
addons.mozilla.org |
009239D5348F40D1695A745470E1F23F43 |
|
login.live.com |
00B0B7133ED096F9B56FAE91C874BD3AC0 |
|
global trustee |
00D8F35F4EB7872B2DAB0692E315382FB0 |
Comodo has stated that these certificates were immediately revoked and the compromise account disabled. IP addresses associated with this attack originate in Iran. Comodo has made the observation that "…domains targeted would be of greatest use to a government attempting surveillance of Internet use by dissident groups." For this reason, Comodo believes that the attack was likely sponsored by a nation-state adversary. They also note that the Iranian government have made previous attempts at attacking other methods of encrypted communications.
According to reports, only one of the nine fraudulent certificates has been observed in use on the Internet (login.yahoo.com). Major web browser vendors are blacklisting these certificates by hardcoding the fingerprints in the web browser. Microsoft has issued Security Advisory 2524375, which provides a software update that customers should install as soon as possible to protect Windows systems. The CTU research team is in the process of developing countermeasures to detect the use of the fraudulent certificates.




